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tive forms. She also ignores the fact 
that his later works abound in the 
pathetic fallacy, engulfing and 
obscuring external reality in personal 
emotion . This imbalance is evident in 
some of Ruskin's sketches of the 
1870s, which Corradini mentions in 
passing. She explains Ruskin's ety-
mologizing and its contemporary 
analogues, but apparently accepts his 
assumption that words have natural 
origins and that a word's "original" 
meaning is the true one. Her analysis 
might have benefited from Derrida's 
"White Mythology", among other 
works. While Corradini notes that 
Ruskin's ideal of adjectival accuracy 
influenced the Decadents, who aban-
doned his moralism, she might have 
mentioned that his aesthetic, combin-
ing dynamism and stasis, anticipates 
Vorticism. Ezra Pound shares 
Ruskin's desire to harmonize fact and 
insight and to promote international 
literary standards through close read-
ing . 
ROBERT CASILLO 
University of Miami 
Liberalism and 
Democracy 
By Norberto Bobbio. 
Translated by Martin Ryle and Kate 
Soper. New York: Verso, 1990. 
Though Bobbio says that "liberal-
ism and democracy have never been 
radically antithetical" (73), the bulk 
of this text, rightly concerns the bor-
der warfare that has raged and ever 
will rage between the partisans of the 
individual (liberals) and those of 
society (democrats). Beginning in the 
ancient world where individual 
rights were essentially unknown, 
Bobbio traces, in a bare ninety pages 
and seventeen chapters, the encoun-
ters of society with those who defend 
the right of the individual against the 
weight of society. His text covers, 
among other things, Hobbes, Locke, 
and natural rights theory, Kant's hos-
tility to state paternalism, the uneasi-
ness of Alexis de Tocqueville and 
John Stuart Mill about the tyranny of 
the majority, the complications aris-
ing out of the encounter of socialism 
and democracy, as well as the prob-
lems raised by the appearance of the 
popular and democratic authoritari-
an state. 
The modern version of the conflict 
between the individual (liberalism) 
and society (democracy) may be seen 
in the impossibility of reconciling the 
contradictory ideals displayed in the 
1789 political slogan: liberte, egalite, 
and fraternite. The problem of recon-
ciling liberty-with its inherent 
recognition of the right of each per-
son to rise to his/ her own chosen 
level (and equality) with its demand 
that before the race begins, everyone 
must be brought to the same level-is 
the prime meridian across which 
stare Rousseau, Mazzini, socialism 
and other leveling forces on the one 
side, and Montesquieu, Cavour, de 
Tocqueville, and defenders of the 
individual on the other. How could 
one ever come to an agreement that 
everything practical had been done 
for equality and that the starting pis-
tol could then be fired? Worse, how 
could one ever come to an agreement 
that everything had been done to 
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bring the many to the starting gate, if 
some still persisted in choosing ludi-
crous life goals: mere wealth for one 
and going on the bum for another? 
But the struggle between the liber-
al and the democrat was not always 
over economics. It can be traced back 
to the determination to stand out 
from the crowd, the moral right to be 
different that is symbolized in the 
clash of Socrates and Athens. As 
noted by de Tocqueville, and later, 
Weber, Kafka, and perhaps Foucault, 
the question was and still remains: 
will the demos-because of its size 
and its suspicion of inequality, differ-
ence, and quality-overwhelm liber-
ty with its suspicion of the many, of 
homogeneity, and the organizational 
man . The liberal asks: "Will the world 
be so homogenized by the time the 
race starts that no one will be inter-
ested in, or have the moral resources 
to be, different?" The democrat asks: 
"Do the community and its traditions 
not have some rights against the odd, 
disruptive, menacing-and unan-
swerable-'why' of the pest and the 
eccentric?" 
In this sense, the conflict pits the 
democrat's faith that the many can be 
brought to share the interests of the 
few against the liberal' s suspicion 
that a state capable of such an 
achievement could only be an Ethical 
State like that of Gentile. In nine-
teenth-century Italy, this debate 
between liberalism and democracy 
was played out, as Bobbio notes, in 
the struggle between the ideals of 
Cavour on the one hand and Mazzini 
on the other . For the liberal Cavour, 
the question was primarily one of 
limiting the state and defending the 
right of the individual to pursue 
interests outside the state, which the 
majority might find objectionable. 
For the republican Mazzini, the issue 
was how the educational role of the 
state to shape its citizens could be 
fulfilled by a minimalist state. As 
Bobbio notes, the issue became a 
drama in real life when Mazzini 
seized power in Rome in 1848 and 
had to confront the liberal French 
Foreign Minister, de Tocqueville, 
whose hostility "sealed the fate of the 
Roman republic" (71). 
Though Bobbio does not note it, it 
was this same confrontation between 
liberalism and democracy that was to 
plague the Italian state right into the 
Giolittian period and beyond. 
Indeed, the question became all the 
more complicated when Giolitti, the 
heir of Cavour's liberal state, found 
that he had to defend liberty and its 
merely procedural rules against a 
majority hostile to liberty and con-
trolled by the Black International or 
the Red. How does one play by the 
rules and defend liberty against an 
illiberal population? It is a question 
one suspects President Yeltsin will 
soon have to answer again. 
Since the rise of socialism, 
Marxism, and other mass political 
movements, but especially since the 
industrial revolution transformed the 
globe, the debate between liberalism 
and democracy has tended (recently 
in the works of Hayek and Nozick, 
for example) to center on a defense of 
the minimal state to protect econom-
ic, property, and acquisitive rights of 
the few. In other words, the conflict 
between the one and the few against 
the many has lost its Socratic flavor 
and has focused on the right of the 
few to consume. The question that 
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Bobbio raises-and as he notes, it 
was a question raised earlier in the 
debate between Einaudi and Croce-
is to what extent is this economic right 
essential to the moral right of liberal-
ism's defense against democracy? 
This is no easy question: If a person 
has decided that wealth is the good 
that he or she above all else wishes to 
pursue, what moral right does the 
puritan have to say this is wrong? 
Inasmuch as the many poor will 
always resent the few that are rich, 
how is one to distinguish legitimate 
moral resentment from the 
Nietzschean ressentiment of the low-
minded? 
This dilemma is only apparently 
made easier by the fact that today 
wealth is as powerful a threat to lib-
erty as the masses ever were; for 
today wealth can pave the globe, buy 
elections, or procure nuclear, chemi-
cal, or biological weapons for entire 
nations of fundamentalist kamikazes. 
In such a world, it becomes plain that 
liberalism and democracy require reg-
ulation. But by whom? 
Bobbio' s answer is that the two 
regimes-liberalism and democra-
cy- must learn to accommodate 
each other and become tense allies . 
To such a complex question, one 
should not expect an answer any 
more definite, though one wishes 
Bobbio had spent more time on the 
necessity of the debate between liber-
alism and democracy rather than on 
explaining the various forms of that 
debate. After all, what will the 
world's fate be if ever an evil, hyp-
notic, and wealthy liberal does wed 
the elusive demos? To put the issue in 
classical terms, liberty requires both 
Socrates and Aristophanes, the 
philosopher and the city. For only by 
recognizing that theory and practice, 
philosophy and rhetoric each have 
their claims and that liberty cannot 
survive the domination of either one 
or the other, can we understand the 
importance of the dialogue and the 
conflict between liberalism and 
democracy. 
EDMUND E. JACOBITII 
Southern Illinois University 
at Edwardsville 
II Sublime: Teorie 
estetiche nell'lnghilterra 
def Settecento 
By Samuel H. Monk. 
Translated by Rachele Garattini. 
Introduction by Giuseppe Sertoli. 
Milan: Marietti, 1991. 
Samuel Holt Monk (1902-1981) 
published The Sublime: A Study of 
Critical Theories in XVIII-Century 
England in 1935 when interest in the 
subject was at its lowest ebb in two 
hundred years . Academic scholarship 
paid little attention to the sublime, 
and no modern school of poetry or 
criticism had found any use for it. 
Nor did Monk succeed in resuscitat-
ing the concept, though when a 
revival did happen-in the 1960s-
his study was republished and hon-
ored as a trailblazer. This Italian 
translation of a classic work in the 
"history of ideas" is a testimony to its 
continuing value. 
Monk's special virtue was to trace 
the concept of the Longinian sublime 
from its humble beginnings as a side 
issue in neoclassicism to its thunder-
